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Abstract: This paper provides an experimental test of the traveller’s dilemma using individual and group data. Our 
investigation aims to address three fundamental research questions, which can be summarised as follows: (i) claims are 
affected by the size of the penalty/reward; (ii) individual decisions differ significantly from group decisions; (iii) 
individual claims are affected by the induction of a focal point a là Schelling. Experimental findings reported in this 
paper provide answers to each of these questions showing that: (i) although the size of the penalty/reward did not affect 
subject choices in the first-period, it played a key role in determining subjects’ behaviour in the repeated game; (ii) 
overall, groups behave more rationally, in the sense that they were always closer to the Nash equilibrium; (iii) the 
reference point did not encourage coordination around the Pareto optimal choice. 
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1. Introduction  
There is an abundant literature relating to the traveller’s dilemma (henceforth TD) (Basu, 1994). 
This game, together with the p-beauty contest game (Keynes, 1936; Moulin, 1986; Nagel, 1995; 
Morone et al., 2008; Morone and Morone, 2008; Morone and Morone, 2010) and the centipede 
game (Rosenthal, 1981; McKelvey, and Palfrey, 1992; Nagel, and Tang, 1998; Palacios-Huerta, and 
Volij, 2009), is often used to demonstrate the tension between clear-cut game-theoretic analysis 
based on serial inductive thinking and the vagaries of actual behaviour.  
Interest in the TD is related to the fact that the optimal strategy depends on what the other player is 
expected to do. It is interesting since the unique game-theoretic prediction for both players’ payoff 
is much worse than their cooperative behaviour payoff. 
Basu proposed a nice and simple story:1 two travellers spend their holiday on a tropical island, 
where they purchase identical and expensive items; on the return trip the airline loses their luggage 
containing the purchased items. In order to reimburse the two travellers for their loss, the airline 
representative asks each traveller separately to fill out a claim, with the understanding that claims 
must be at least x and no greater than X (with x < X). Claims will be fully reimbursed if they are 
equal. But if they are different both travellers will receive the lower claim. Additionally, the lower 
claimant will receive a small reward, and the higher claimant will incur a small penalty deducted 
from the reimbursement. Obviously, each person has an incentive to “undercut” the other, so no 
common claim above x can constitute a Nash equilibrium.  
Basu proposed this game in order to demonstrate the conflict between intuition and game-theoretic 
reasoning in a one-shot game, where backward induction occurs at an introspective level. As it 
seems, game theoretic reasoning gives a clear-cut answer to what should be expected in the TD. 
However, “All intuition seems to militate against all formal reasoning in the traveller’s dilemma. 
Hence the traveller’s dilemma seems to be one of the purest embodiments of the paradox of 
rationality in game theory because it eschews all unnecessary features, like play over time or the 
nonstrictness of the equilibrium” (Basu, 1994: 391).  
It is puzzling that a small penalty/reward can drive claims to the Nash equilibrium prediction, 
where the outcome minimizes the aggregate payoff. On the one hand, the Nash equilibrium in the 
TD is independent of the size of the penalty/reward. On the other hand, intuition suggests that 
behaviour conforms closely to the Nash equilibrium when the penalty/reward is high, but when the 
penalty/reward parameter approaches 0, subjects’ behaviour should approach the Pareto optimal 
                                                
1 The story was first told by Basu at the American Economic Association annual conference in January 1994, and 
subsequently published in the Association Journal.  
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solution (where both travellers claim X). In this paper we present a laboratory experiment to 
evaluate whether average claims are affected by: (i) the size of the penalty/reward; (ii) group 
decisions; (iii) a reference point a là Schelling.2 
The first of these research questions has been broadly investigated, consistently showing that 
penalty/reward size does matter. In contrast, to the best of our knowledge, the latter two research 
questions have never been addressed within a TD framework. However, we believe both latter 
questions are relevant. In fact, our second research question allows us to compare individual and 
group decisions within a strategic game, an area of enquiry, which has gained momentum over the 
last years in experimental literature. Whereas, the third research question is motivated by our firm 
conviction that the TD game typically conducted in the laboratory, even though the game is 
theoretically identical, differs from Basu’s story since it omits to mention the actual value of the lost 
items. We believe the items’ value represents a reference point a là Schelling, i.e. a solution that 
people might tend to use in the absence of communication, because it seems natural, special or 
relevant to them. Hence, introducing a reference point should encourage coordination around the 
Pareto optimal choice and help to integrate experimental results with the travellers’ original story. 
In the following section we briefly review the literature on experimental tests of the TD as well as 
on group decisions. Experimental design is discussed in section 3. Section 4 presents our 
experimental results and section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review 
Recently, a growing body of experimental literature has explored differences between individuals 
and groups (or between groups of different size) in various decision contexts involving strategic 
behaviours. Examples are the beauty-contest games (Kocher and Sutter, 2005; Kocher and Sutter, 
2007; Sutter, 2005), centipede games (Bornstein et al., 2004), ultimatum games (Bornstein and 
Yaniv, 1998), dictator games (Cason and Mui, 1997), signalling games (Cooper and Kagel, 2005), 
and pair-wise choices experiments (Bone 1998; Bone et al., 1999 ; Bateman and Munro, 
2005; Shupp and Williams, 2008; Masclet et al., 2009; Morone and Morone, 2012). 
                                                
2 A reference (or focal) point (also called Schelling’s point) is a solution that people will tend to use in the absence of 
communication, because it seems natural, special or relevant to them. Schelling himself illustrated this concept with the 
following problem: Tomorrow you have to meet a stranger in New York City. However there is no means of 
communication between you. So, where and when do you meet them? This is a coordination game where any place in 
the city at any time tomorrow is an equilibrium solution. Schelling asked a group of students this question and found the 
most common answer was “noon at (the information booth at) Grand Central Station.” There is nothing that makes 
“Grand Central Station” a location with a higher payoff (you could just as easily meet someone at a bar, or in the public 
library reading room), but its tradition as a meeting place raises its salience, and therefore makes it a natural “focal 
point” (from Wikipedia - mildly edited). 
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However, not much attention has been given to investigate the differences between individual and 
group decisions in the TD game. This contrasts against a relatively large body of literature 
experimentally dealing with the TD, which we will briefly discuss hereafter. Moreover, as already 
mentioned in the introduction, none of the main TD experimental tests has ever dealt with the effect 
of introducing a reference point in the game played in the laboratory. 
Whenever the TD game has been tested in the lab, experiments confirmed the intuition that claims 
may be higher than the Nash equilibrium, which predicts the lowest possible claim no matter how 
small the penalty/reward is. Capra et al. (1999), for instance, ran a repeated TD experiment, and 
showed that the size of the penalty/reward matters. Specifically, the Nash equilibrium strategy 
solution proved to be a good predictor of people’s behaviour in a TD with small penalty/reward and 
a rather bad predictor if the penalty/reward parameter was big. 
Becker et al. (2005) proposed an experimental adjustment on the TD: testing it on participants who 
were experts in game theory. The fact that their results confirm the general findings, namely that the 
behaviour in experiments is far from the Nash equilibrium prediction, indicates that these findings 
should not be attributed to any lack of understanding of the game, but rather represent a robust 
pattern of behaviour. 
Rubinstein (2006) reported on an unconventional experiment conducted during the years 2002 and 
2003. He collected large amounts of data from audiences in a public lecture that he delivered at 
several universities. People who were invited to attend the lecture (mainly students and faculty) 
were asked to respond (on the website gametheory.tau.ac.il) to several questions before the lecture 
including one question that was a simplified version of the TD. As reported by the author, only 13% 
of respondents reported an answer in line with the game theoretical prediction. Moreover, on 
average, they would do poorly playing against a player chosen randomly from the respondents. As 
put by Rubinstein, “These players can claim to be the ‘victims’ of game theory” (2006: 875).  
Chakravarty et al. 2010 conducted a laboratory experiment with pre-play communication, finding 
that pre-play communication does not help raise claims. Surprisingly, claims were highest when 
players could communicate using precise numerical messages even though, theoretically, such 
communication is not self-enforcing. 
Finally, Basu et al. (2011) isolated deviations from the Nash behaviour caused by differences in 
welfare perceptions and strategic miscalculations. Their experimental findings suggest the 
dominance of the change in one’s own reward/penalty over the change in the other player’s 
reward/penalty. They also found that expected claims are inconsistent with actual claims in the 
asymmetric treatments. Moreover, focusing on reported strategies, they documented that changes in 
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choices across treatments are, to a large extent, explained by risk aversion.  
 
3. Experimental design 
The experiment presented here was conducted at the ESSE laboratory of experimental economics at 
the University of Bari in November 2008. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the 
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants were undergraduate students from different 
disciplines, enrolled at the University of Bari. 
Students played a repeated TD game; in total, nine experimental treatments were run, each 
involving 20 participants.3 Written instructions on the experiment were distributed prior to its 
commencement.4 In all treatments amounts were denoted by ECU (Experimental Currency Unit), 
where 100ECU = 1€. The average payoff, earned in about 15 minutes, was 9€ (including a 
participation fee of 3€). 
As mentioned, the experiment consists of nine treatments, grouped into three sessions: control 
session (T1, T2, and T3); group session (T4, T5, and T6); and reference session (T7, T8, T9). Each 
treatment was carried out once. The three sessions are designed to investigate (i) the impact of the 
size of the penalty/reward; (ii) the impact of group decisions; (iii) the effect of a reference point a là 
Schelling.  
In each control treatment (T1, T2 and T3), players were randomly paired and were allowed to 
interact for 10 periods in a ‘stranger design’. During each period subjects were asked to report a 
number between 40 and 200. If both subjects in a couple reported the same number, then their 
payoff would have been the reported number. If they reported different numbers, then they would 
get different payoffs. More precisely, the subject who reported the smallest figure received the 
minimum reported figure plus a reward, and the subject who reported the largest figure received the 
minimum reported figure minus a penalty. In T1 the reward/penalty was set equal to 2ECU; In T2 
the reward/penalty was set equal to 25ECU; In T3 the reward/penalty was set equal to 40ECU.  
Groups’ treatments (T4, T5 and T6) were identical to the control treatments, but this time decisions 
were made by randomly created groups5 of two subjects (dyads) instead of single subjects. In fact, 
                                                
3 Treatments 4, 5 and 6 involved 40 participants, which where divided into 20 randomly created groups of two. 
4 An English translation of the Italian instructions for the experiment can be provided upon request. 
5 We are aware that there are many factors that can affect group decisions (e.g. gender, age, placement of group 
members). Additionally, the social interaction between a man and a woman can be quite different than between two 
men or two women.  For instance, "beauty" and other stereotypes can have huge impact on the outcomes of group 
decisions (Andreoni and Petrie, 2008). To minimise the impact of such problems, we kept the pairs identity confidential 
so that each group member maintained anonymity with subjects communicating through the computer interface. 
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these treatments involved 40 players grouped into dyads, which were subsequently paired to play 
the TD game. 
Also the reference treatments (T7, T8 and T9) were identical to the control treatments, but in this 
case participants were selected in a more sophisticated way. In order to induce a reference point, we 
initially recruited 40 subjects and let them participate in a task completely unconnected with the TD 
experiment. At the end of this task, half of the subjects earned 200ECU and the other half earned 
40ECU. Subsequently, those players who earned 40ECU were paid and let go, whereas those 20 
subjects that gained 200ECU were sent to a different laboratory where they found new 
experimenters who were unaware of how much money they had gained in the previous task.6 Now, 
these subjects, in order to get paid, were paired and asked to claim their payoff in the usual Basu’s 
setup, i.e. knowing that if they claimed the same amount their payoff would have been the reported 
number; however, if they claimed different numbers they would get different payoffs (the clamed 
amount minus/plus a penalty/reward). 
In all treatments, decisions were referred to as “claims” and the earnings calculations were 
explained without reference to the context, (i.e. without mentioning the luggage travellers’ 
scenario); hence, all treatments were designed to be contest free. A table summarizing the structure 
of the experiment is reported below (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Treatments’ parameterisation 
Penalty/Reward 
Treatments 
Control 
Session 
Group 
Session 
Reference 
Session 
2ECU T1 T4 T7 
25ECU T2 T5 T8 
40ECU T3 T6 T9 
 
 
4. Results 
In order to address our first research question (i.e. the impact of the penalty/reward on subjects’ 
claims) we calculated and reported, by means of a box-plot, the period-by-period claims for 
treatments 1, 2, and 3, as shown in Figure 1.  
                                                
6 We decided to introduce a reference point in this way since, as well-established experimental literature shows (Guth 
and Ortman, 2006; Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Cherry et al., 2002; Bosman, et al., 2005), people behave, ceteris 
paribus, differently if their own earnings are at stake (effort experiment) than they would if a budget was provided to 
them like a sort of manna from heaven (no-effort experiment). 
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As mentioned above, the Nash equilibrium prediction is 40ECU for all treatments, however, the 
first-period median in Figure 1 falls between 99 and 125 (more precisely, it is 99.5 in T1, 124.5 in 
T2, and 118.5 in T3).  We tested and found that deviations from the equilibrium for the first-period 
claims are not statistically different at the 1% significance level across the three treatments. This 
finding would suggest that the size of the penalty/reward does not affect subject choices in the first-
period.  
Looking at the ten periods compiled in Fig.1, the picture changes. We observe that: (i) the 
variability of subjects claims decreases over time, and (ii) the penalty/reward parameter plays a key 
role in determining subjects’ behaviour. In fact, when the penalty/reward is equal to 2ECU (i.e. T1) 
we can observe a clear convergence to the Pareto optimal solution; when it is equal to 40ECU (i.e. 
T3) we can observe a convergence to the Nash equilibrium; finally, when it is equal to 25ECU (i.e. 
T2) subjects’ claims are somewhat below the Pareto optimal solution. 
 
Figure 1. Period-by-period claims in treatments 1, 2 and 3 
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 In order to statistically corroborate these results we performed, separately for each treatment, a 
generalized linear mixed regression with individual claims as the dependent variable and periods 1 
to 10 (Period 1-10) as the independent variable. The model has random effects at one level, namely 
the individual choices. The regression results, reported in Table 2, support the hypothesis that the 
penalty/reward parameter plays a key role in determining subjects’ behaviour: the coefficient of 
Period 1-10 is positive and significant (at the 1% level) in T1, it is very small and significant (at the 
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5% level) in T2, and negative and significant (at the 1% level) in T3. Moreover, the constant is 
comparable in magnitude in the three treatments.  
Table 2. Generalized linear mixed effects regressions 
Individual claims on periods 1 to 10 – treatments 1, 2 and 3 
Control Session: T1  
Independent variable Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 
Constant 126.880 10.883 11.660 0.000 
Period 1-10 3.832 0.759 5.040 0.000 
Control Session: T2 
Independent variable Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 
Constant 129.430 8.928 14.500 0.000 
Period 1-10 1.646 0.812 2.030 0.043 
Control Session: T3     
Independent variable Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 
Constant 111.920 7.574 14.780 0.000 
Period 1-10 -4.976 0.762 -6.530 0.000 
 
The regression results, reported in Table 2, confirm that the differences in claims among treatments 
are due to different time trends and not to a shift in the (initial) level of claims (i.e. a lower intercept 
in the regression). These, in line with earlier results, provide a further answer to our first research 
question, suggesting that the size of the penalty/reward influences the equilibrium in a repeated TD 
game. Explicitly, a small penalty/reward leads to Pareto, whereas a large penalty/reward leads to 
Nash.  
Treatments 4, 5 and 6 allow us to address our second research question: assessing if group decisions 
show significant differences when compared to individual decisions. In fact, as we will show, our 
second session results differ significantly from earlier results.  
In Figure 2 we reported the box-plot of the period-by-period claims of subjects in treatments 4, 5 
and 6. As discussed in section 3 above, in these treatments each single claim is the outcome of a 
group decision. In the first-period the median claim falls between 58 and 65 (more precisely, it is 
equal to 65 in T4, 58.5 in T5, and 64 in T6).7 Interestingly, these first-period group claims are 
systematically lower and statistically different (at the 1% significance level) from those observed in 
the first-period individual decision treatments. It appears that, in a one-shot game (i.e. the first-
period), groups behave more rationally, in the sense that they are always closer to the Nash 
equilibrium.  
                                                
7 Also in this case we tested and found that deviations from the equilibrium in the first-period claims are not statistically 
different at the 1% significance level across T4, T5 and T6. 
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Figure 2. Period-by-period claims in treatments 4, 5 and 6 
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
T4 T5 T6
 
 
When looking at the repeated game, other interesting results arise. In the treatment with a 
penalty/reward parameter equal to 40ECU the median of claims rapidly converges to the Nash 
equilibrium and the variability of subjects’ claims narrows (from the third period onward). Also 
with a smaller penalty/reward (set equal to 25ECU) the median claim decreases over time, although 
at a slower pace. In contrast, with the smallest penalty/reward (set equal to 2ECU), the trend 
reverts. Moreover, even though the T4 median converges to the Pareto optimum, the variance of the 
claims is stubbornly high. This is due to the fact that 40% of the groups claimed systematically 
close to the Nash equilibrium, whereas the remaining 60% claimed haphazardly – in one period 
playing (close to) Nash and in the subsequent period playing (close to) Pareto.  
In order to better appreciate differences, we report a direct comparison of the two sessions in Figure 
3. Specifically, each thin line connects the period-by-period median claim for treatments 1, 2 and 3; 
and each thick line connects the period-by-period median claim for treatments 4, 5 and 6. The data 
plots are bounded by two horizontal dashed lines that show the maximum and minimum claims of 
200ECU and 40ECU, respectively.  
It appears that the group session is steadily closer to the Nash equilibrium when compared to the 
control session; confirming that groups are more rational than individuals. However, this 
‘rationality gap’ reduces significantly when the value of the penalty/reward is set equal to 40ECU 
and picks up when the penalty/reward is set equal to 25ECU.  
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Figure 3. Median Claims for Control Session and Group Session 
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Another interesting feature emerging from this comparison refers the slope of the ten periods trend. 
In fact, when looking at the treatments with a small penalty/reward (T1 and T4) the two sessions 
show a common upward trend. Similarly, when looking at the treatments with a large 
penalty/reward (T3 and T6) the two sessions show a common downward trend. A diverging picture 
emerges when comparing the two sessions when the penalty/reward is set equal to 25ECU (T2 and 
T5). In this case, the trend is upward in the reference session and downward in the group session. 
This finding might suggest that strategic and rational behaviours emerge earlier (i.e. with a smaller 
penalty/reward) when decisions are undertaken in groups rather than individually.  
These findings are statistically robust; in Table 3 we report the results of the generalized linear 
mixed regression concerning T4, T5, and T6. First, as in the previous session, we can accept the 
hypothesis that the penalty/reward parameter plays a key role in determining subjects’ behaviour. 
Moreover, comparing the estimated coefficient in T1 with T4, in T2 with T5, and in T3 with T6 we 
can test if groups affect decision in a TD game. As it seems, the intercept is always higher in T1, 
T2, and T3 with respect to T4, T5, and T6, thus suggesting that groups claim significantly less than 
individuals. Additionally, comparing T3 with T6, we can state that groups converge faster to the 
Nash equilibrium (when the penalty/reward parameter is big) and comparing T2 with T5 we can 
conclude that groups converge to the Nash equilibrium, but individuals converge to the Pareto 
equilibrium (when the penalty/reward is not set equal to 25ECU). 
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Table 3. Generalized linear mixed effects regressions 
Individual claims on periods 1 to 10 – treatments 4, 5 and 6 
Group Session: T4  
Independent variable Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 
Constant 63.863 10.663 6.360 0.000 
Period 1-10 6.238 1.101 5.670 0.000 
Group Session: T5 
Independent variable Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 
Constant 88.58 8.471 10.460 0.000 
Period 1-10 -1.981 0.819 -2.420 0.016 
Group Session: T6     
Independent variable Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 
Constant 97.613 8.050 12.120 0.000 
Period 1-10 -5.259 1.089 -4.830 0.000 
 
We conclude our investigation considering the effect of a reference point a là Schelling in the TD 
game. In Figure 4 we report the period-by-period average claim for treatments 7, 8 and 9. As 
explained earlier, in these treatments subjects earned a payoff of 200ECU in a previous task; as we 
believe, this provided them with a clear reference point. The first-period median in T7 is 42, in T8 it 
is 100, and it is equal to 100.5 in T9.8 Also in this case, these first-period group claims are 
systematically lower and statistically different (at the 1% significance level) from those observed in 
the first-period of the control treatments.  
Figure 4: Period-by-period claims in treatments 7, 8 and 9 
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8 Also in this case we tested and found that deviations from the equilibrium in the first-period claims are not statistically 
different at the 1% significance level across T7, T8 and T9. 
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For the sake of clarity, we report a summary of the first-period claims across all nine treatments in 
Table 4. Hence, contrary to our expectations, providing subjects with a reference point equal to the 
upper bound does not increase the number of subjects playing at (close to) the Pareto end of the 
spectrum. Apparently, in a one-shot game the reference point does not encourage coordination 
around the Pareto optimal choice, but rather it stimulates strategic behaviours, pushing individual 
choices towards the Nash equilibrium. 
 
Table 4. First-period median claims 
Penalty/Reward 
Treatments 
Control 
Session 
Group 
Session 
Reference 
Session 
2ECU  (T1, T4 and T7) 99.5 65.0 42.0 
25ECU (T2, T5 and T8) 124.5 58.0 100.0 
40ECU (T3, T6 and T9) 118.5 63.0 100.5 
 
An overall look at the repeated game basically confirms our earlier findings. Figure 5 reports a 
direct comparison of the two sessions. Specifically, each thin line connects the period-by-period 
median claim for treatments 1, 2 and 3; each thick line connects the period-by-period median claim 
for treatments 7, 8 and 9. Again, data are bounded by two horizontal dashed lines showing 
maximum and minimum claims. It can be seen that the reference session is (almost) always below 
the control session; suggesting that providing a reference point improved subject rationality rather 
then pushing them to play (closer to) the Pareto end of the spectrum. 
 
Figure 5. Median Claims for Control Session and Reference Session 
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To statistically corroborate this graphical analysis we report in Table 5 the results of the generalized 
linear mixed regression concerning T7, T8 and T9. Now, by comparing these results with earlier 
findings (T1, T2 and T3), we can confirm that the reference session is closer to the Nash 
equilibrium when compared to the control session, but this gap closes when the value of the 
penalty/reward is set equal to 40ECU. Consistent with earlier findings, the outcome of this test also 
suggests that the presence of a reference point does not improve subjects’ coordination towards 
Pareto.  
 
Table 5. Generalized linear mixed-effects regressions 
Individual contributions on periods 1 to 10 – treatments 7, 8 and 9 
Reference Session: T7  
Independent variable Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 
Constant 53.683 11.305 4.750 0.000 
Period 1-10 9.896 1.086 9.100 0.000 
Reference Session: T8 
Independent variable Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 
Constant 94.676 9.491 9.970 0.000 
Period 1-10 -0.766 0.848 -0.900 0.366 
Reference Session: T9     
Independent variable Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 
Constant 95.776 9.615 9.960 0.000 
Period 1-10 -2.322 0.742 -3.130 0.002 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we reported on a laboratory experiment on the traveller’s dilemma conducted at the 
ESSE laboratory (Bari University, Italy) at the end of 2008. The aim of this experiment was to 
address three fundamental research questions, which can be summarised as follows: (i) claims are 
affected by the size of the penalty/reward; (ii) individual decisions differ significantly from group 
decisions; (iii) individual claims are affected by the induction of a focal point a là Schelling. 
Experimental findings reported in this paper provide answers to each of these questions. With 
reference to the first question, although the size of the penalty/reward did not affect subject choices 
in the first-period, it played a key role in determining subjects’ behaviour in a repeated game. In 
line with earlier literature, we found that a small penalty/reward leads to Pareto, whereas a large 
penalty/reward leads to Nash. 
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As for the second research question, we found that, in a one-shot game (i.e. the first-period of our 
experiment), groups behave more rationally in the sense that they were always closer to the Nash 
equilibrium. This finding was confirmed in the repeated game where we found that the group 
session was steadily closer to the Nash equilibrium than the control session; however, this 
‘rationality gap’ reduced significantly when the value of the penalty/reward was set higher.  
Finally, we tested the effect of a reference point on individual claims. Contrary to our expectations, 
we found that the reference point did not encourage coordination around the Pareto optimal choice, 
but rather it stimulated strategic behaviours, pushing individual choices towards the Nash 
equilibrium. 
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